This paper analyzes the potential spillovers of acute financial stress in China, accompanied by a sharp slowdown in Chinese growth, to the rest of the world. We use three methodologies: a structural VAR, an event study, and a DSGE model. We find that severe financial stress in China would have consequential spillovers to the United States and the global economy through both real trade links and financial channels. Other EMEs, particularly commodity exporters, would be hit the hardest. The U.S. economy would be affected to a lesser degree than both EMEs and other advanced economies, and the primary channel of transmission to the U.S. could well be adverse financial spillovers through increased global risk aversion and negative equity market spillovers.
Introduction
China's prominence in the global economy has grown rapidly over the past 20 years. Since the country's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China's economy has become much more interconnected with the rest of the world and its aggregate and per capita GDP have more than quadrupled. No doubt, this remarkable economic rise has yielded many benefits to Chinese citizens through increased standards of living and poverty reduction. And it also has benefited many people around the globe, as China's low-cost labor has more efficiently made available a larger variety of goods to consumers all over the world. Increasingly, though, China's growth has been credit-fueled and investment-focused, which has led to the development of notable financial vulnerabilities. In particular, there is now a large stock of nonfinancial corporate debt, the housing market appears overheated, and there is likely significant overcapacity in certain sectors. Non-traditional financial intermediation activities ("shadow-banking") have also proliferated involving opaque products, with traditional banks having deep connections to the shadow-banking activities and institutions. These developments leave the financial system heavily exposed to risky corporate and local government debt. Chinese authorities still have sizable resources to deal with potential problems, but policy space and buffers have diminished in recent years. All told, the increased financial vulnerabilities have raised concerns about a hard landing in China and the potential global spillovers from such an event in an increasingly trade-and financially-integrated world. This paper first summarizes China's financial vulnerabilities (section 2) and the evolution of China's economic and financial linkages with the rest of the world (section 3). It then examines in section 4 the historical spillovers of Chinese equity markets to global (including U.S.) financial markets and undertakes an event study of the impact of Chinese events in recent years (such as the 2015-16 "China scare") that seemed to roil global financial markets. Without attempting to offer the likelihood of a hard landing, it then quantifies the potential transmission channels of two China stress scenarios ("adverse" and "severely adverse") to the rest of the world and, particularly, to the United States. We examine these spillover effects using two methodologies: The first is an estimated structural vector autoregression (SVAR) that identifies domestically-originated shocks to Chinese GDP after taking into account the effects of various global factors on Chinese GDP (section 5); the second is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that combines information from the VAR and extra financial spillovers motivated by our event study to compute the "all-in" effects of Chinese stress scenarios (section 6). Section 7 of the paper concludes.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. First, the VAR estimates suggests that the China adverse scenarios would have sizable effects on global variables in the expected direction. In particular, the dollar would appreciate, U.S. long-term yields would fall, global Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) spreads would rise, and world trade would fall (consistent with significant increases in EME risk premiums and safe haven flows to the United States, as well as China's importance in global trade flows). In addition, there would be a substantial fall in global oil and metals prices (consistent with China being a major source of global demand for commodities).
Second, the VAR estimates also suggest that the hit to economic activity in different countries and regions would generally be significant (consistent with China's strong trade links with other economies). More specifically, the output hit to EME commodity exporters would be about ¾ as large as the hit to China itself; to other EMEs would be about half; to advanced economies excluding the United States slightly more than a third; and only a relatively modest hit to the United States. The smaller U.S. effect reflects the U.S. economy being more closed, limited direct U.S. financial linkages to China, and greater capacity at the moment (than other advanced economies, say) to ease monetary policy to cushion the blow.
Third, our event study of the China 2015-16 episode suggests that despite the limited direct financial linkages of the United States with China, adverse scenarios in China, including a hard landing, could roil U.S. markets (and other markets around the world, for that matter) much more than the historical linkages embedded in the VAR suggest. Sustained depreciation of the Chinese currency and capital outflows from China during this episode had unusual reverberations for global markets, with significant declines in equities around the world, a retrenchment of global risk appetite, and fall in long-term advanced-economy yields.
Finally, once we amp up the financial spillovers in light of the China 2015-16 episode, our DSGE model simulations suggest that the hit to output abroad from adverse China events would be magnified, especially in the advanced economies. For example, output losses in the United States would triple from being modest to become about one-third of the hit to Chinese GDP. Thus, in the event of a China hard landing, the main effect on the U.S. economy could well be through asset price movements and changes in global risk sentiment.
Our paper adds to the literature on the spillover effects of a sharp slowdown in Chinese growth (See, for example, Ahmed (2017) , Dieppe et al. (2018) , Gilhooly et al. (2018) , and Ma, Roberts, and Kelly (2017) ). Our approach is most similar to Dieppe et al. (2018) and Gilhooly et al. (2018) .
Those papers use similar empirical methodologies to estimate the global spillovers from a slowdown in China, obtaining results quite consistent with ours. However, our paper is relatively more focused on economic and, especially, financial spillovers to the United States. A distinguishing contribution of our paper, is that we provide evidence of the growing importance of China's economic and financial linkages with the global economy. This paper also supplements the literature on understanding the vulnerabilities of the unique Chinese financial system. (See Hsieh and Klenow (2009 ), Song et al. (2011 ), Manu et al. (2018 , Li et al. (2014) , Perry and Weltewitz (2015) , Li (2016) , and Ehlers et al. (2018) ). This includes a focus, in particular, on developments in recent years during which policy space and the international reserves buffer have diminished in China, and developments in China have increasingly affected world financial markets.
Financial Vulnerabilities in China
China has developed notable financial vulnerabilities since the global financial crisis (GFC). The financial system has grown rapidly and become very large in both absolute size and in relative terms for China's level of economic development. These facts, by themselves, do not necessarily signal vulnerabilities but, on many fronts, developments in the Chinese financial system over the past several years are concerning. China's nonfinancial private credit has doubled since the GFC to more than 200 percent of GDP, a threshold that has often been followed by adverse consequences (Figure 1 ). 1 The country's stock of nonfinancial private debt is now second only to the United States in the world. Besides businesses being highly leveraged, household indebtedness is also rising. The banking system, which is now the largest in the world in terms of total assets (Figure 2), reports adequate buffers, but banks are heavily exposed to risky corporate and local government debt. Additionally, the large nonbank financial sector could be susceptible to liquidity 1 Almost half of the eleven countries that have sustained this level of debt experienced a financial crisis within five years of crossing this threshold. problems and runs. It bears noting, though, that the Chinese government also has substantial resources to support any troubled financial and nonfinancial institutions.
Turning to an assessment of individual sectors, some vulnerabilities in the financial sector have increased since just before 2015-2016, when Chinese financial markets were shaken by the discrete devaluation of the renminbi, capital outflows, and the subsequent large movements in Chinese equity prices. Delinquencies are rising amid a slowing economy. Although banks' capital levels appear adequate, they may prove insufficient in the event of a more pronounced slowdown in economic activity, especially taking into account the banks' deep connections to shadow-banking activities and institutions. The Chinese shadow-banking sector is focused on credit intermediation through non-traditional products, such as wealth management products (WMPs). 2 These products compete with bank deposits for corporate and household savings, typically offering closed-ended instruments with short maturities (mostly under 3 months). An important portion of these products are guaranteed and marketed by banks. The proceeds of this funding are invested in longer-term assets such as corporate loans or bonds. The opaqueness of these products and the expectation that guaranteeing banks or the government will bail them out in periods of stress, may lead investors to underestimate their risks. Aware of these risks, Chinese regulators have recently focused on curtailing the growth of the riskiest activities with some success.
The nonfinancial corporate sector may have sizeable vulnerabilities. The corporate debt-to-GDP ratio has increased nearly 15 percentage points since the end of 2014 and stood in end-2017 at over 160 percent (Figure 3) . Similarly, household debt has risen briskly due to the sharp increase in mortgage borrowing that has accompanied the rapid rise in house prices, especially in the largest cities. The household debt-to-GDP ratio has jumped almost 14 percentage points since the end of 2014 and has reached a level (more than 50 percent of GDP) that is high for an EME.
Balancing these vulnerabilities are strong positions in the external and sovereign sectors. China has more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and a current account surplus. Reserves have fallen in recent years, but their level remains high. 2 The main products in the Chinese shadow-banking sector are trust company loans, entrusted loans, and wealth management products (WMPs). Trust companies manage assets for high-net individuals and institutions and invest in a range of products including bank loans and corporate bonds and loans. Entrusted loans are loans made by one nonfinancial firm to another nonfinancial firm with a bank serving as an intermediary. WMPs are short-term investment products, often marketed by banks that invest in both equity and fixed income products.
The ultimate backstop for a financial stability event is intervention by the sovereign. In China, such intervention is easier because the government has significant resources, the financial system is closed-with little dependence on borrowing from abroad-and largely state-controlled.
However, China's fiscal space has decreased in the past five years. To be sure, it still has a relatively low ratio of official fiscal debt of about 40 percent of GDP that has not changed substantially since 2014 ( Figure 3 ). But this debt stock does not include off-budget fiscal items such as the liabilities of local government financing vehicles (LGFVs). 3 After adding these offbalance sheet items, the augmented sovereign debt level is an estimated 68 percent of GDP, which is on the high end for other emerging market economies, albeit low compared to advanced economies.
The sizeable vulnerabilities in the Chinese financial system could be fertile ground for an event that threatens financial stability. 4 We do not analyze the possible triggers for such an event, because they are difficult to predict. Under the current circumstances, some potential examples of triggers include a series of local government and corporate bond defaults that dent consumer and investor confidence, a large property sector bust hurting consumer investment and spending, and a further escalation of trade tensions hurting corporate profits and spending. Any of these triggers could precipitate the sharp and stressful slowdowns in the economy that are analyzed in our scenarios.
China's Linkages with the Rest of the World

Evolution of China's economic and financial importance
China's global importance has grown rapidly over the past 20 years. Since becoming a member of the WTO in 2001, China has increased its footprint on the global economy through both trade and financial channels. To quantify the evolution of the relative importance of China across many dimensions, we construct a time-series of rankings of countries based on financial and macroeconomic indicators. The ranking is composed of indicators grouped into three categories: 3 LGFVs are entities founded by local governments to finance projects on their behalf. They enjoy implicit debt repayment support, but are legally separate from the government. The use of these off-budget vehicles has greatly expanded after the GFC. In recent years, the central government has attempted to clamp down on this off-budget borrowing by prohibiting local governments from providing support to LGFVs, while at the same time allowing local governments greater leeway to borrow on-budget. Nonetheless, LGFV borrowing has continued to grow. 4 A financial stability event encompasses financial crises and other periods of financial stress, not officially classified as crises, that create notable financial disruptions. size, interconnectedness, and U.S. interconnectedness. The first component measures how big a country is on various metrics. The second component measures the overall linkages of a country to other economies based on the indicators used. And, the third component focuses more specifically on a country's linkages with the United States. Our motivation for distinguishing between the second and third components is that it helps to identify to what extent the United States may be directly exposed to a particular country, such as China, versus how it might be indirectly affected by a country through that country's links to other countries that are also linked to the United States.
To construct the rankings we use information from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Bloomberg, Haver Analytics, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The size category is comprised of a measure of real GDP, equity and bond market capitalization, and the size of the banking sector and other non-bank financial institutions. For interconnectedness we use measures of trade, foreign direct investment, and cross-border portfolio investments and bank loans.
The methodology to rank countries follows a multistep approach. First, countries are ranked based on each individual data series for every year. Second, rankings are averaged across these series within each category (and year) and countries are ranked again based on these averages. Last, the average ranking across the three categories is calculated and this average is used to construct the overall ranking. 5 The evidence, thus, highlights not just the growing importance of China in the global financial 5 If at least two of the series in the size category have observed values (i.e., are not missing) for a country in a given year, then we calculate the size ranking for that country; otherwise we set that ranking to missing. For the interconnectedness and U.S. interconnectedness series, we require a minimum of 4 observed values to calculate the ranking for the country in a specific year. To calculate the overall ranking for a country, we require at least two categories with non-missing rankings. system but how the stronger ties between China and the rest of the world could amplify the transmission of shocks originating in China to the United States.
U.S. financial institutions' exposures to China
The international banking literature has noted that shocks can be propagated through the activities of global financial institutions (Buch and Goldberg, 2015; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; Correa, Sapriza, and Zlate, 2012) . To assess the importance of this transmission channel in the spillovers from China to the United States, we describe the direct and indirect exposures of the U.S. financial sector to Chinese residents. We use information on consolidated banking exposures from the BIS Consolidated Banking statistics. For U.S. banks, these bank exposures are collected in the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) 009 report and bank capital information is aggregated using the reporting in the FFIEC 031 and FR Y-9C forms. Table 1 (Table 2) , with claims representing 95 percent and 277 percent of these banking sectors' Tier 1 capital, respectively. 7 However, U.S. banks, in turn, do not have very large direct exposures to banking sectors of these economies (Table 3) , with claims on U.K. banks, for example, representing 2 percent of U.S banks' Tier 1 capital.
As shown in
Beyond banks, other U.S. financial institutions are also exposed to China through holdings of Chinese financial assets. These exposures, totaling about $114 billion, are mostly of equity securities and most of those securities are held by mutual funds. The total exposure of all U.S. 6 Note that the FFIEC 009 report provides a conservative measure of exposures. Claims are only adjusted for explicit third-party guarantees, near-perfect hedges, and certain liquid collateral held outside the country of the borrower. 7 To calculate the claims as a percentage of a banking sector's tier 1 capital, we use data on capital from the IMF financial soundness indicators. financial institutions only represents 3 percent of their foreign securities portfolio and 0.2 percent of their total portfolio. So, adding in indirect exposures does not seem to significantly make the United States more at risk in the event of Chinese financial institutions getting into trouble. U.S. banks can also be indirectly exposed to China through claims on commodity exporters, which benefit by a notable demand from Chinese residents. U.S. bank exposures to EME commodity exporters totaled almost $300 billion at the end of June, 2018 (Table 4) MMFs exposure to Chinese financial institutions was $5.6 billion at the end of May 2018 (Table 5) , mostly in unsecured instruments (such, as time deposits).
Financial market spillovers
Given limited exposure of U.S. financial institutions to China, to the extent that problems in China could lead to a hit to the U.S. economy and financial system, they would likely come through direct trade links and any disruptions to global (including U.S.) financial markets that a China distress scenario may engender. Such disruptions in U.S. financial markets from troubles in China are not implausible, given the "China scare" episode of 2015-16 when concerns about China seemed to trigger movements in asset prices globally. Therefore, part of the new analysis in this paper is to examine the linkages between Chinese and U.S. equity markets, both historically and in the volatile period of 2015-16, which we undertake in the next section.
Spillovers through Equity Markets
Methodology and results
We analyze the significance of equity market using a variance decomposition approach proposed by Yilmaz (2009, 2012) . As a simple example of the method, assume that the returns of the headline equity indexes for China and the United States follow this first-order VAR process:
(1) where , , , , is a 2 2 matrix of coefficients, and ~ 0, Σ , with Σ , , , 1,2 , are independently and identically distributed disturbances.
The goal of the variance decomposition method is to assess the impact of orthogonal shocks to each country on other countries' forecast errors. To do so, we rewrite Eq.
(1) as a moving average, as follows: 9
(2) where are orthogonal shocks. As in Diebold and Yilmaz (2012) , we use the generalized approach of Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998) to recover . 10
Using the structural parameters retrieved from the matrices in Eq.
(2), we can construct the forecast error variance of U.S. stock returns as:
This expression shows that a fraction of the U.S. forecast error variance is explained by domestic shocks, as in . 9 The moving average representation is obtained under the assumption that is a covariance stationary process. 10 This approach shocks one variable at a time and integrates out the effects of other shocks using the historically observed distribution of the errors. This method has two desirable characteristics. First, the orthogonalization (and, therefore, the impulse-response functions) does not depend on the ordering of countries in vector , which is a typical way in which structural shocks are identified in a structural VAR. Second, the orthogonalization obtained with this method is unique, in the sense that there is no other matrix that satisfies the identification conditions.
We use weekly local-currency-denominated headline indexes for 22 countries. The sample is composed of 13 advanced economies (AFEs), 6 emerging markets (EMEs), plus China and the United States. We estimate the VAR using 52-week (backward looking) rolling windows between January 1996 and October 2018. The share of the one-week ahead forward variance explained by shocks originating in China (dX,CN) are plotted in Figure 7 . We report the share of the forecast error variance grouped for AFEs and EMEs, and separately for the United States.
The main takeaway from the this exercise is that, as with direct exposures of financial institutions, the impact of shocks to Chinese equity markets on equity markets elsewhere does not appear to be outsized according to the historical experience. For the three groups of countries analyzed, emerging markets, the United States, and other advanced economies, the share of the forecast error variance explained by China has increased in recent years but still remains very small, ranging from 2-5 percent.
Event study analysis
The historical experience notwithstanding, we know that some Chinese events in recent years (for example, in 2015-16 as noted earlier, but others too) have created substantial volatility in global financial markets. Therefore, we proceed to conduct a more detailed event study analysis to quantify the impact of specific recent shocks originating in China on global asset prices and exactly how outsized they are compared to historical experience. We identify five recent events in China that precipitated dramatic reactions in global financial markets:
(1) Sudden credit crunch affecting China's commercial banks on June 20, 2013, as indicated by the Shanghai interbank overnight lending rate shooting as high as 30 percent from the usual rate of less than 3 percent.
(2) Following substantial losses in Chinese equity markets, an acceleration of capital outflows, and amid global concerns about Chinese growth, Chinese authorities implemented a sudden, discrete 2 percent devaluation of the Chinese renminbi against the dollar on August 11, 2015.
(3) A few weeks later, on August 24, a precipitous drop in the stock market that became known as "China's Black Monday" occurred, where the Shanghai stock index declined by almost 8.5 percent of its value.
(4) and (5) Two large and sudden declines in the Chinese stock market of above 7 percent between January 4 and January 7, 2016 that led to the trigger of automatic circuit breakers that halted trading. 11 Capital outflows continued during these episodes. Table 6 reports the changes and percent returns for select global financial assets and indicators before and after the Chinese events previously described. 12 We find that during these events the broad dollar index appreciated about ¾ percent, with larger appreciations against EME currencies than AFE currencies. In addition, world equity markets fell between 3 percent and 4½ percent, and investor risk appetite as measured by the VIX and VDAX decreased. Along with the significant declines in global equities and a retrenchment of global risk appetite, we find that flight to safety flows lowered long-term AFE yields, as negative market shocks from China spilled over to assets abroad.
To put the above numbers into perspective, the spillovers from the China market turbulence roughly corresponds to the 1 percent tail of the distribution for each financial asset, computed from the overall historical experience discussed in the previous subsection. Given these extreme outcomes relative to the overall historical experience, in some of our simulations later, we use the estimates from these tail events to calibrate the impact of financial stress in China on financial variables in the rest of the world to examine the spillovers of tail events in China.
Aggregate Channels of Transmission and Their Importance
In this section, we take a holistic approach to assess the potential spillovers of a Chinese growth slowdown precipitated by financial stress in the country on the rest of the world. To get a detailed picture, we need to estimate the effect of such an event on a large set of global and country-specific macroeconomic and financial variables. This poses a methodological challenge because most 11 The automatic circuit breakers led to a halting of trading for brief periods and also led early in the day on July 7, after a quick 7 percent decline, to suspension of trading for the remainder of the day. The circuit breakers were later abandoned because, outside of the period when trading stood suspended, they appeared to increase volatility. 12 is Chinese GDP growth. In order to have greater confidence that we have identified exogenous domestically-originated shocks to Chinese GDP, we assume that Chinese GDP growth is affected contemporaneously (within the quarter) by all other variables, but that Chinese GDP growth can affect the other variables only with a lag. 16 That is, Chinese GDP growth comes last in a recursive contemporaneous causal ordering. Any change in China's GDP growth that cannot be accounted for by developments in these global indicators is taken to originate from domestic factors. After 13 A methodology that allows using a very large number of variables is the factor augmented VAR (FAVAR) of Bernanke et al. (2005) . We opted for not using this methodology, because the interpretation of the factors in the model is unclear and this would make it difficult to interpret the structural shocks in the model. 14 One limitation of our approach is that we do not take into account the correlations between all the variables that we are interested in analyzing. An alternative methodology that would account for such correlations is the GVAR (Global Vector Autoregressive) model. The reason why we opted for not using GVAR model, is that this methodology limits the number of variables per country/economic block that can be studied. However, Ericsson et al. (2014) use both a VAR and GVAR model to study the effects on global growth of a China GDP growth slowdown and find that the results based on the two models are broadly comparable (especially in the short-to medium-term). 15 Appendix A provides a more detailed description of the VAR model and how the shocks are identified. 16 The eight global variables are ordered as follows: U.S. long-term yields, broad nominal dollar, VIX, EMBI spreads, oil price, metals prices, G7 economies GDP growth, and growth of global imports excluding Asian EMEs.
identifying exogenous Chinese GDP shocks, the effects of these shocks on the global variables included in the model are traced out.
Second stage
In the second stage, we estimate numerous other two-variable SVAR models, with one variable always being the identified domestic shock to China's GDP growth from the first stage model and the second variable being different outcome variables, in turn. These second outcome variables could be other global variables of interest that are not included in the first-stage model or countryspecific variables (most notably GDP growth of different countries). The second-stage models are then used to trace out the effects of a Chinese GDP growth shock on these other outcome variables of interest. Since we have already identified exogenous Chinese GDP growth shocks from the first stage, we feel comfortable in putting them first in the causal ordering in the second-stage SVARs.
Results
First, note that, in both stages we include a constant term, a linear trend, and a dummy variable for the years 2008 and 2009 to account for the GFC. We include the linear trend to account for possible trends in the data (e.g., China's GDP growth rate has been on a downward trend), and we include the GFC dummy variable because we see the GFC as an extreme event and we do not want the analysis to be overly influenced by this period/event. 17 Figure 8 shows the response of all the variables included in the VAR model to a negative unit China GDP shock (equivalent to 1 percentage point decrease in quarter-on-quarter Chinese GDP growth). Starting with the financial variables, our results show that, in response to a surprise decrease in China's GDP, U.S. long term yields decrease, the dollar appreciates, and the VIX and EMBI spreads both increase, as would be expected. Our results also show that both oil and metals prices decrease substantially following the adverse China output shock, a result that is also not surprising given the importance of China for global demand for commodities. We also find that a negative China GDP surprise pushes both aggregate G7 GDP growth and world trade excluding EME Asia lower.
First-stage results
These results suggest that an adverse China GDP shock is akin to a negative global demand shock, pushing U.S. long-term yields, commodity prices and economic activity indicators lower.
Moreover, the responses of the dollar, the VIX, and the EMBI spread are consistent with a negative China GDP surprise leading to a retrenchment of global risk appetite. The fall of U.S. long-term yields is also consistent with a decrease in global risk appetite, as safe-haven capital flows from risky to safe assets push these yields lower).
How much of the fluctuation in global variables and in China's own GDP growth be explained by domestic Chinese growth shocks? To address this question, we compute the forecast error variance decompositions (FEVD) of the variables in the VAR model.
The results, presented in Table 7, For the decomposition of China's own GDP growth, it is interesting that about a quarter (over the short run) to half (over the longer run) of the fluctuations are accounted for by external shocks. This is consistent with China being a conduit of global demand because of its importance in global supply chains.
Second-stage results
Our second-stage results, presented in Figure 9 , focus on the effects of Chinese growth on growth elsewhere in the world. 18 A negative Chinese GDP shock brings down substantially growth of EMEs elsewhere, especially those of commodity exporters. Growth in advanced foreign 18 The confidence intervals shown in Figure 9 (and also in Figure A1 in the Appendix) should be seen as a lower bound for the real size of the 90% confidence intervals around the estimated impulse response functions because we did not account for the fact that the China GDP socks were estimated in the first stage. Ultimately, what these confidence intervals tell us is that the effects of a China GDP slowdown are quite uncertain, and therefore any policy response to such an event should take this high degree of uncertainty into consideration. economies other than the United States is also affected significantly, while the effect on U.S. growth, although still negative, is more modest.
Similar to what we did in the first stage, we also compute variance decompositions for the secondstage outcome variables. The results are presented in Tables 8. As can be seen from this table, China's GDP growth shocks account for a significant proportion of growth fluctuations in other EMEs (especially commodity exporters) but much less so for advanced economies (especially the United States).
The results in Figure 9 and Table 8 are consistent with growth in EMEs being highly connected to
China's economic growth, especially through commodity trade linkages, and with AFEs economies being on average more open than the United States, and therefore more exposed to shocks from China affecting global trade. Therefore, not only EMEs' GDP responds more to developments in China's economy than that of AFEs and the United States, volatility in EMEs'
GDP is more linked to volatility in China's GDP that that of AFEs and the United States.
Spillovers of a China GDP growth slowdown
To analyze the global spillovers from a financial distress scenario in China, we first need to identify concretely the impact of the distress scenario on China's own GDP growth. Specifically, we consider two different hypothetical scenarios with varying levels of distress that are calibrated to different points of the historical distribution of growth slowdowns following financial distress. In the "adverse" financial distress scenario, we assume a 4 percent decline in output relative to baseline, which corresponds to the 50th percentile of growth slowdowns in the distribution of historical financial crises. 19 Whereas, in the "severely adverse" financial distress scenario, we assume an 8½ percent decline in output relative to baseline, which corresponds to the 80th percentile of historical growth slowdowns during financial crises.
We use these two scenarios to quantify the potential effects of extreme events in China on the global economy, based on the VAR models described in the previous sub-sections. Specifically, to estimate the spillover effects of the two adverse scenarios for China's GDP, we simulate a sequence of shocks to China's GDP growth rate that generate a response of China's GDP equal to 19 We estimate the historical impact on growth of financial crises by computing the difference between the average annualized real GDP growth in the two years prior to a financial crisis with the average real GDP growth in the two years after a financial crisis. The financial crisis episodes are taken from the database compiled by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) and Laeven and Valencia (2013) .
that assumed in each scenario and shown in Figure 10 . We then feed the two sequences of shocks (one for each scenario) into the estimated SVAR models to obtain an estimate of the response of the variables of interest to these shocks. Figure 11 shows the response of GDP for various regions/countries and Figure 12 shows the response of several financial variables.
The results shown in Figure 11 show that the hit to economic activity around the world can be quite substantial. The effects on U.S. GDP are relatively modest, while those on AFE GDP are more than twice larger than that on the U.S. In the severe scenario and relative to the baseline, U.S. output declines by slightly more than 1¼ percent and AFEs output declines by more than 3¼ percent (just over a third of the hit to Chinese GDP itself). GDP in other EMEs falls close to 6 percent below baseline, over two-thirds of the decline in Chinese GDP. Among EMEs, EME commodity exporters are hit much harder than EME commodity importers.
Turning to the effects on financial variables (Figure 12 ). U.S. long-term yields fall substantially, which suggests that the negative effects on yields of increased flows into safe-haven assets dominates the positive effects of any Chinese sell-off of reserves. Global EMBI spreads rise, with a peak increase of over 350 basis points in the severe scenario, and risk aversion (as measured by the VIX) increases substantially. The broad nominal dollar appreciates (about 7 and 15 percent in the mild and in the severe scenarios over roughly two years, respectively). Finally, with China a key driver of world commodity demand, oil and metals prices tumble in both scenarios.
DSGE Model Simulations
The event study analysis we discussed earlier, particularly the China 2015-16 episode, suggests strong spillovers from China to global financial markets. Thus the VAR could be underestimating Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) . The version we use consists of three blocks, which are structurally identically, but calibrated differently to capture the U.S. economy, the advanced foreign economies (or AFEs), and Different scenarios in SIGMA can be generated through shocks to, for example, exchange rate risk premiums, household confidence, and corporate spreads. As the current version of SIGMA has only an aggregate EME block, we use the results from our SVAR to construct an overall EME GDP response to a financial stability event in China. In each simulation, we feed in a series of shocks to the EMEs in our SIGMA model to mimic the response in each of our two Chinese adverse scenarios. 21 Therefore, the GDP responses of the EMEs, shown in Figure 13 , Panels A and B, are by construction identical to the ones embedded in the SVAR analysis.
We start by simulating SIGMA under the assumption that no additional shocks occur. In this case the United States and the AFEs are only affected by standard trade channels built into our SIGMA model and the small endogenous response of financial variables that is embedded in SIGMA. We then re-run the simulations with additional shocks to the corporate and currency risk premiums in the U.S. and AFE blocks, calibrated to capture both flight-to-safety flows and other spillovers to The adverse effects on advanced economies from a financial stability event in China are notably bigger if turmoil in China causes reverberations in other financial markets around as those implied by the event-study we presented earlier of the 2015-16 episode. The solid lines of panels C and D the EMEs. In addition to many other features the model contains a financial sector that assigns an explicit role to financial shocks in driving the economy. Monetary policy in each block follows a Taylor rule and can be simulated subject to an effective-lower-bound (ELB) constraint. For a more detailed discussion of the elements of the model please see Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2006) , which describes the basis for the current model. The extensions most relevant for the current simulations are contained in Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (2008) , Gust, Leduc, and Sheets (2009) , Erceg and Lindé (2010) , Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2011) . 21 We also used a set of shocks hitting the economy 2 years before the crisis begins to place the model into an initial condition similar to the world economy in mid-2018. This matters for the possibility of a binding zero lower bound in the simulations. All simulation results are reported as deviations from the paths implied by those initial shocks. We used data from Haver Analytics and the World Economic Outlook to construct that baseline. 22 The GDP losses occur despite an accommodative U.S. monetary policy response, which follows the model's policy reaction function. depict this for both a medium and hard landing scenarios in China. U.S. GDP falls a bit more than 1 percent in the medium scenario and shy of 3 percent in the hard scenario; these effects are about a third of the hit to the Chinese economy. In AFEs, output falls by about 1½ and 3¾ percentage points in the two scenarios, respectively.
According to these results, the spillovers to advanced economies as a whole from a China crisis and associated problems in other EMEs would be significantly bigger than we have observed in previous EME crises. One obvious reason for the bigger response is the rising share of China and other EMEs in global GDP and trade. Another important reason for stronger spillovers could be the limited scope for monetary policy to respond appropriately to negative shocks in several advanced economies. While the U.S. policy rate is now sufficiently away from the ELB, the constraint on monetary policy in the AFEs becomes binding in the simulation for the hard landing scenario with financial spillovers.
In Panels E and F of Figure 13 
Conclusions
China's economic heft and its linkages with the world economy have increased over the past two decades. The surprise RMB depreciation in 2015, and the subsequent reverberations felt around world financial markets, demonstrated how deeply integrated into the global economy China has become. The event also showed that financial channels have increased in importance in recent years in addition to the trade channel, which has traditionally been the dominant transmission mechanism for spillovers from emerging market economies. This paper formally documents the evolving macroeconomic and financial linkages between China and the rest of the world, and assesses the impact of various adverse scenarios in China on the United States and the rest of the world using three approaches-a VAR, an event study analysis, and a DSGE model.
We find that a hard landing in China would have consequential spillovers to the global economy, including the U.S. economy, both through real and financial channels. In particular, there would be substantial output hits in both emerging market economies and advanced economies. The All in all, a Chinese hard landing would be a big global event and lead to serious negative spillovers to economic growth around the world, especially if it roiled global financial markets.
Appendix A Let Yt denote a K-dimensional time series, t=1,…,T, which we assume to be well approximated by an SVAR model of order p
In equation (1) Where ut=B0 -1 t represents the vector of reduced form shocks, A0=B0 -1 C0, and Ai= B0 -1 Bi, i=1,..,p.
While we estimate (2), we are ultimately interested in using (1) to analyze the effects of changes in t on Yt. The problem is that there is not a unique mapping between (1) and (2), and, in order to go from (2) to (1), it is necessary to make some identifying assumptions. In our application, we assume that B0 is lower triangular and that its main diagonal elements are all equal to 1. This, in practice, means that we assume that each variable yjt, j=1,…,K, included in Yt is only contemporaneously affected by the variables ybt for which b<j. That is, we assume a recursive relationship between the elements of Yt. Another implication from our assumption for B0, is that we can identify the variance of the structural shocks, and therefore the structural shocks are in the same unit as the corresponding variable. 26 Appendix B Figure A1 replicate the results shown in Figure 9 and addx the results based on VAR models in which we do not control for the GFC (by excluding the dummy variable for the years 2008 and 2009).
As shown in Figure A1 , controlling for the GFC matters the most for the estimated effects of a China GDP shock on the U.S. and AFEs GDP. In particular, when we do not control for the GFC, the long run effect of a China GDP shock on U.S. GDP is more than three times larger than when we control for the GFC. For AFEs, the effect of a China GDP shock it twice as large when we do not control for the GFC than when we do. In the case of EMEs, we also find that the effects of a China GDP shock are larger when we do not control for the GFC, but the relative magnitudes are smaller than in the cases of the U.S. and AFEs GDP.
The results excluding the GFC dummy suggest that, during the GFC, China's GDP and that of the rest of the world commoved substantially and that China may be more integrated in the global economy than our baseline results, those including the GFC dummy, suggest. The relative difference between the two sets of results, excluding and including the GFC dummy, based on the SVAR analysis indicate that there could be a non-linear transmission of shocks between China and the rest of the world. This higher level of integration or interconnectedness is something we do not consider in the baseline SVAR, and only allow for the higher level of integration when we use the SIGMA model. Alternatively, it can be argued that the GFC is a rare event and that we should control for it in our statistical analysis because the statistical models, such as the SVAR model, are not adequate tools to study the effects of rare events.
The results discussed in this appendix are important because they show that, if a China GDP slowdown could lead to a crisis similar to the GFC, then the estimates of a China GDP slowdown shown in section 5 should be seen as a lower bound of the true effects of a China GDP slowdown on the global economy. 
